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The search for a relationship between central bank laws and monetary policy outcomes, which 
began three decades ago, is part of a larger enterprise to discover the monetary policy framework 
that delivers the best macroeconomic performance. 
A monetary policy framework is a set of institutional arrangements under which monetary 
policy decisions are made and executed.
1
 It includes central bank law and the degree of 
independence it gives the central bank. It also includes other formal and informal arrangements 
between the central bank, government, and other institutions. And it includes the custom and 
practice of the economists and decision-makers in the central bank and government. 
The best macroeconomic performance that monetary policy can deliver remains controversial 
but a dispassionate and research-supported view is that it cannot influence the average level of 
output or unemployment and the best contribution it can make is to deliver low inflation at a 
point on the Taylor curve—the efficiency frontier between the variability of inflation and the 
output gap
2—consistent with the preferences expressed through the political process. Points 
above the Taylor curve are inefficient and points below it are unattainable. 
Within this broad research agenda, what has been discovered about the effects of central bank 
laws on monetary policy outcomes? Do central bank laws influence monetary policy and the 
inflation rate? Do independent central banks do the best job? What other features of the 
monetary policy framework matter for achieving low inflation and low variability? Does 
inflation targeting beat central bank independence as a source of good macroeconomic 
performance? 
What follows is an attempt to answer these questions. Part I provides an overview of work 
that has measured central bank independence and looked for a (negative) relationship between 
independence and inflation or independence and other variables. Part II examines the main 
criticisms of this work and provides a new and expanded evaluation. Part III presents two natural 
experiments made possible by events over that past three decades that shed new light on the 
questions posed above. And Part IV offers some speculative thoughts about changing constraints 
on central banks that might challenge their independence and influence. 
By way of brief preview, I will argue that most of the search for a relationship between 
central bank independence and inflation has found only modest additions to what we knew thirty 
years ago. But two natural experiments suggest that more independent central banks lower the 
variability of inflation and might lower average inflation, with no change in the variability of 
output; and inflation-targeting central banks lower inflation and might lower the variability of 
both inflation and real GDP growth regardless of the independence of the central bank. 
                                                 
1 Fry et al (2000, p. 3). 
2 Taylor (1979, p. 1281) graphs the Taylor curve. The standard deviations of the inflation rate and the output gap measure variability. 
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I THE SEARCH FOR THE EFFECTS OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 
The search for the effects of central bank independence (CBI) on inflation and other features 
of macroeconomic performance has employed five alternative CBI measures, one a classification 
and the others indexes. Table 1 summarizes them in order of increasing complexity.
3
 To set the 
scene for a critical appraisal and three decade perspective, it is necessary to summarize the 
alternative measures, the test performed using them, and the conclusions reached. 
Table 1 Alternative Measurements of Central Bank Independence 
Study Inputs Variables Countries 
Bade-Parkin 1978, 1982, 1988 
(BP) Central bank statutes 3 12 
Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini 1991 
(GMT) Central bank statutes 16 18 
Alesina 1988 and Alesina-
Summers 1993 (AS) Average of BP and GMT  16 
Cukierman 1992 Central bank statutes and survey 26 68 
Fry-Julius-Mahadeva-Roger-Sterne 
2000 (FJMRS) 
Bank of England survey of 
central banks 54 93 
Bade-Parkin 
The CBI measurement proposed by Bade-Parkin (1978, 1982, 1988) was guided by the 
positive theory of monetary policy,
4
 which suggests that policies depend on whether the 
decision-maker is a discretionary, democratically-elected, and relatively short-lived government 
or a rule-governed, autonomous, and relatively long-lived central bank for which reputation is an 
important consideration. For twelve advanced economies
5
, the laws that establish and govern the 
central bank were examined to determine whether: 
1. The government or the central bank is the final monetary policy authority 
2. Any government officials are members of the central bank board 
3. The government appointed all or only some of the board members 
                                                 
3 Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006) provide a useful summary of the literature reviewed here. 
4 Gordon (1975), Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro (1983), Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b), Backus and Driffill (1985), and Meltzer and 
Cukierman (1986)) 
5 Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
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Of the eight possible central bank types resulting from combinations of ‘yes-no’ answers to 
these questions, only four were present in the central banks studied, so they were classified as 
being one of four types: 
1. Least independent: Government is the final monetary policy authority, has an official 
on bank board, and appoints all board members. 
2. Second least independent: Government is the final monetary policy authority, no 
government official on the bank board, but all board appointments made by 
government. 
3. Second most independent: The central bank is the final monetary policy authority and 
all board appointments made by government. 
4. Most independent: The central bank is the final monetary policy authority and some 
board appointments are made independently of government. 
BP looked for the effects of independence by using dummy variables for each central bank 
type in regressions explaining cross-country inflation variability. They found that only type 4 
central banks deliver significantly
6
 lower inflation. It was not possible to separate types 1, 2, and 
3. So in the 1978 paper they concluded that “there is strong evidence that central banks which are 
independent of central governments both in policy making and in the appointment of directors 
deliver a low rate of inflation but not necessarily low variability of monetary policy. … [and] … 
monetary policies do not appear to differ significantly as between ‘independent’ central banks 
and government-dominated central banks where the ‘independent’ central bank has a directorate 
entirely appointed by government.” 
Two later papers
7
 confirmed these conclusions and additionally examined effects of CBI on 
policy reaction functions. The conclusion of this exercise was that “there do not appear to be any 
systematic differences in the macroeconomic variables that trigger policy reactions across 
different central bank types.” 
Parkin (1987) investigated the relationship between CBI and the government budget deficit 
process and found a further interesting CBI effect. For most of the countries investigated those 
with independent central banks had a smaller mean government budget deficit.
8
 
All the subsequent work departed from the BP approach of classifying and ranking central 
banks and constructed a CBI Index with cardinal properties. The first of these was GMT. 
  
                                                 
6 Unless otherwise noted, any statement about significance will mean at the 5 percent level. 
7 Bade and Parkin 1982 and 1988. 
8 France and the United States were exceptions and didn’t fit the pattern of other countries. 
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Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) is a broad and comprehensive study of the 
relationship between politics and economic policy making and central bank independence is only 
a part of this broader study. Nonetheless, these authors provided the first comprehensive coding 
of central bank laws for a group of eighteen advanced economies and constructed the first CBI 
Index. Their index, which ranges from zero (least independent) to 16 (most independent), is the 
sum of the ‘yes’ answers to questions about appointments, policy formulation, statutory policy 
goals, and central bank financing of government
9
. GMT call the sum of the first 8 “yes” answers 
an index of political independence and the sum of the second 8 an economic independence index. 
In cross-country regressions with the inflation rate as the dependent variable, both political 
and economic independence are significant (and of expected sign) during the 1970s and 
economic independence alone is significant during the 1980s. The estimates imply that a unit 
increase in the economic index lowers the inflation rate by 1.2 percentage points during the 
1970s and by 1.9 during the 1980s; and a unit increase in the political independence index lowers 
inflation by 0.6 percentage points during the 1970s. 
In the GMT political independence index, some variables are similar to those used in the BP 
classification, so these results agree with and reinforce the BP finding for the 1970s but not for 
the 1980s. BP did not examine the variables that feature in the GMT economic independence 
index, so finding a significant effect for this range of variables is new and suggests an important 
omission from BP. 
Alesina-Summers 
Alesina (1988) used the BP classification but as a cardinal index by assigning a value to each 
type: 1 for the least independent to 4 for the most independent. Alesina also extended the 
sample
10
 and used other information to give Italy a score of 0.5 (the least independent). This 
paper was the first to convert the BP ordinal types to an index with cardinal properties. 
Alesina and Summers (1993) combined Alesina’s BP index with the GMT political 
independence index to create their own CBI index, which they used in informal scatter diagrams 
to inspect the relationship between CBI and both the mean and variance of inflation, real GNP 
growth, per capita real GNP growth, unemployment, and the real interest rate. 
                                                 
9 The sixteen questions are: (1) Is the governor not appointed by government? (2) Is the governor appointed for more than 5 years? (3) Are some 
of the board not appointed by government? (4) Is the board appointed for more than 5 years? (5) Is there no mandatory participation of 
government representative in the board? (6) Is no government approval of monetary policy formulation required? (7) Is there a statutory 
requirement that the central bank pursues monetary stability amongst its goals? (8) Is there a legal provision that strengthens the central bank’s 
position in conflicts with the government? Are government direct credit facilities with the central bank (9) not automatic, (10) at a market interest 
rate, (11), temporary, and (12) of a limited amount? (13) Does the central bank not participate in primary market for public debt? (14) Does the 
central bank set the discount rate? (15) Is banking supervision not entrusted to the central bank alone, or (16) at all? 
10 Alesina added Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain to the BP twelve countries. 
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This informal analysis suggested that independent central banks deliver lower inflation but 
not deliver lower variability of either inflation or the real variables examined. 
Cukierman 
The scope of the studies reviewed above was restricted to sixteen advanced industrial 
economies. In contrast, the next wave of work started by Cukierman (1992) was broadly defined, 
detailed, and complex. The range of countries studied expanded to 68, so included a large 
number of developing and emerging economies. 
Cukierman’s CBI measurement used a set of sixteen variables11 similar in scope to those of 
GMT but more finely graduated to take on a total of 69 different values. He set a priori 
reasonable but essentially arbitrary weights for each of his variables to combine them in a single 
CBI “legal variables index,” (LVA) that ranges from zero (not independent) to one (maximal 
independent). His data lie in a range from 0.10 (Poland) to 0.68 (Switzerland). 
Cukierman also distinguishes between legal independence and what he calls “actual 
independence” and measures the latter in two ways. For 24 countries, he conducted a survey of 
“qualified individuals in various central banks” seeking information on nine variables similar in 
scope to those for legal independence. The responses were used to construct a CBI 
“questionnaire variables index” (QVA) again that ranges from zero to one. For this index, the 
data lie in a range 0.12 (Ethiopia) to 1.00 (Germany). For the full sample of 68 countries, 
Cukierman measures actual independence as the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR). 
This variable ranges between 0.03 or 33 years (Iceland) and 0.93 or 13 months (Argentina). 
Treating his indexes and the sub-indexes from which they are constructed as cardinal 
measures of CBI, Cukierman undertakes an extensive statistical investigation. In a cross-country 
regression of all countries with the rate of depreciation of the real value of money
12
 as the 
dependent variable and nine sub-indexes
13
 of CBI, he finds that only the turnover rate of 
governors is significant. Nothing else remotely shows any significance and the overall 
explanatory power of the equation is weak with R
2
 = 0.28. 
Using the same variables but for only the sixteen countries of GMT and AS, a variable based 
on who decides loans to the government and TOR show significance. Again, the estimated 
coefficients are small but now R
2
 gets to around 0.5. 
                                                 
11 The variables are (1) term of office of CEO, (2) who appoints the CEO, (3) how the CEO may be dismissed, (4) whether the CEO may hold 
other office, (5) who makes monetary policy, (6) who may issue directives and resolve conflict, (7) the central bank’s influence on the 
government budget, (8) the central bank’s objectives, (9) limitations on advances, (10) limitations on securitized lending, (11) who decides 
lending terms, (12) who may borrow from the central bank, (13) limitations on loans, (14) restrictions on the maturity of loans, (15) restrictions 
on interest rates, and (16) restrictions on lending in the primary market 
12 The rate of depreciation of the real value of money equals π/(1 + π), where π is the inflation rate. 
13 The nine sub-indexes measure objectives, properties of the governor, policy formulation, limitations on lending (five variables), and the 
governor turnover rate, TOR. 
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Cukierman suspects that multicollinearity is the source of insignificant parameter estimates 
and does a further set of regressions using LVA—his legal independence index—along with 
TOR, and a new variable, COMP constructed as the ratio of the governor’s actual term to the 
legal term. In an all-countries regression, LVA is totally insignificant but COMP is significant (t-
statistic = 2.7). In a developed-countries regression, LVA is on the edge of significant (t-statistic 
= 2.0). In a less-developed countries equation, nothing is significant. 
Using the data from his questionnaire in a regression with seven sub-indexes
14
, Cukierman 
finds a variable based on financial independence to be significant but of the wrong sign and quite 
large (+ 0.3). None of the other sub-indexes is significant. Using only the QVA index, that 
variable gets a large significant negative coefficient. But in the same regression, TOR has an 
even larger and wrong sign significant coefficient. 
Cukierman completes his analysis with a Granger causality test that shows two-way causality 
between inflation and TOR. 
The overall conclusion that emerges from Cukierman’s work is that the evidence for a 
negative relationship between CBI and inflation is weak and that whatever TOR is truly 
measuring influences and is influenced by the inflation rate. 
Fry-Julius-Mahadeva-Roger-Sterne 
A monumental study by economists working at the Bank of England Centre for Central Bank 
Research built on but took much further the ideas of GMT and Cukierman. FJMRS “define an 
overall measure of independence over a range of characteristics covering legal objectives, goals, 
instruments, finance of the government deficit, and term of office of the Governor.”15 They also 
construct a number of other indexes designed to get at transparency and commitment to an 
inflation target. 
The data that generates the FJMRS indexes come from a survey conducted in 1998 by the 
Bank of England Centre for Banking Studies and responded to by 93 central banks.
16
 The survey 
and the resulting descriptive indexes map what these authors call “the monetary policy 
framework.” Their measurement identifies the focus of a central bank’s policy (the exchange 
rate, the quantity and growth rate of money, or the inflation rate), and constructs an 
“Independence score” as a weighted average of five sub-scores: Whether the bank (1) has a 
statutory or legal objective of price stability, (2) has target independence, (3) is instrument 
independent, (4) finances the government deficit, and (5) has a long term of office for its 
                                                 
14 The seven sub-indexes measure tenure of governor, lending limitations, conflict resolution, financial independence, intermediate targets, the 
priority given to price stability, and subsidized credits. 
15 Fry et al (2000), Chapter 4, p. 68. 
16 A potential weakness of this approach is that central banks might report what they would like others to believe about them, rather than what an 
objective observer would see. 
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governor. Separately from their independence score, they code variables designed to capture 
transparency and the place of financial stability in setting monetary policy instruments. 
These authors use their independence score and other sub-indexes to conduct a thoughtful 
qualitative investigation of the relationships among features of the monetary policy framework 
and its possible effects on macroeconomic performance. They refrain from running regressions 
and they offer no simple conclusion. They title their chapter on measurement “The devil in the 
detail of monetary policy frameworks” and the devil doesn’t allow them to stray far from detail. 
There is a lot of detail to devour and digest. 
Although FJMRS don’t run regressions using their indexes, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2009) do, 
and they obtain an amazing result. Using the AS-CBI index rescaled
17
 for the period 1955 – 
1988, and the FJMRS index for the period 1988 – 2000, they estimate the same effect of CBI on 
inflation for both periods. For each 10 percent points increase in the CBI index, the inflation rate 
falls by 0.65 percentage points. A CBI index value of zero delivers inflation of 9.5 percent per 
year and an index value of 100 (most independent) delivers 3 percent per year. The truly 
remarkable fact is that the two CBI index numbers are constructed on a different basis and are 
arbitrary and different in the weights attached to their underlying components.
18
 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (CF) suggest that the 1990s had lower inflation than earlier decades 
because central banks became more independent and attribute nearly two-thirds of the fall in 
inflation to this cause. I return to CF below. 
Meta Regression Analysis 
The CBI indexes constructed by GMT, AS, and Cukierman were used in 59 empirical 
regression studies during the 1990s and 2000s all of which were revisited in a meta regression 
analysis conducted by Klomp and de Haan (2010),
19
 who concluded that the particular measure 
of central bank independence used has little effect on its estimated effect and there does exist a 
significant negative relationship between CBI and inflation. Independent central banks do deliver 
lower inflation. 
The work that I have described is large in volume, meticulous, somewhat rigorous, and 
apparently clear about its conclusion: Independent central banks deliver lower inflation rates. 
How credible and strong is this conclusion? 
  
                                                 
17 The rescaling is multiplying by 25 to put it on a 0 to 100 range equivalent to the FJMRS index. 
18 I return to this finding and its interpretation below. 
19 Klomp and de Haan provide the details of the 59 studies. 
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II EVALUATING THE FINDINGS: WHAT DO WE KNOW? 
Thomas Cargill and others have suggested that despite the work and claims that I have 
summarized, we don’t know much about the relationship between CBI and inflation. They have 
questioned the robustness of the statistical findings, noted the difficulty of measuring 
independence, suggested that the CBI indexes are more appropriately regarded as ordinal 
rankings than cardinal measures suitable for econometric analysis, and emphasized non-
legislated features of independence (contrasting de facto independence
20
 with de jure 
independence) that better explain a central bank’s monetary policy choices and inflation 
outcomes. 
Before elaborating on these criticisms, it is helpful to think about the constraints on the search 
for the effects of CBI. We have data on n central banks whose independence is described by k 
differences that might be relevant for predicting the effects of CBI on inflation and 
macroeconomic performance generally. We can code each of these k characteristics ‘yes’ a 
central bank has it, or ‘no’ it doesn’t. With this binary coding of k characteristics, there are 2k 
possible central bank independence types. If k is small enough, we can classify central banks by 
independence type, rank the types, and look at mean inflation rates and other macro performance 
variables by central bank type. For this approach to work, we must have fewer independence 
types than central banks, so 2
k
 must be smaller than n. For the 12 central banks of BP, k can’t 
exceed 3, and for the 93 central banks of FJMRS, k can’t exceed 6. 
To study the effects of independence with descriptions that exceed these small numbers of 
characteristics, it is necessary to construct a CBI index that combines the characteristics. Such an 
index cannot enjoy the rigorous properties of a price or quantity index and must of necessity be 
arbitrary. Nor can it enjoy unique mapping from characteristics to index and back to 
characteristics. Many different configurations of characteristics map to a single index number. 
With these general considerations firmly in mind, I now examining Cargill’s doubts and then 
offer some further reasons why caution is needed in interpreting the statistical findings. 
Cargill Critical Assessment 
Cargill (2013) presents a well-argued critical assessment focusing on the astonishing CF 
finding. He contrasts two statistical models of the effects of CBI on inflation: 
(1) Inflation = β0 + β1CBI + ε 
and 
(2) Inflation = β0 + β1d1 + ε 
                                                 
20 Cukierman’s “actual independence”. 
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where CBI is the FJMRS index
21
 and d1 is a dummy variable = 1 for CBI > 90 and zero 
otherwise. Equation (1) is CF’s and equation (2) is Cargill’s alternative, which bifurcates central 
banks into groups of more independent and less independent. In the sample period 1988 – 2000, 
the second equation outperforms the first in explanatory power (R
2
 = 0.19 for 1 and 0.31 for 2 
and t-statistic on β1 = 2.65 for 1 and 3.47 for 2). 
Cargill also estimates a series of equations in which he successively drops the most 
independent, the next most independent, and so on until the ninth most independent central bank 
is dropped. As successive central banks are dropped, the estimated CBI index coefficient falls 
and its significance weakens, becoming insignificant after the three most independent central 
banks are dropped. 
Cargill concludes from these exercises that the relationship between CBI and inflation is 
driven by the most independent central banks, a conclusion that is identical to that of BP at the 
start of this research program, and that “The dummy variable results reaffirm the standard result; 
however they also suggest that information content of the specific measure of independence is 
not great and can be approximated by a dummy variable.” 
Cargill’s interpretation of his finding can be improved upon. It isn’t that the dummy variable 
“approximates” a “specific measure”. It measures something else. To see clearly what is going 
on, I am going to return to the simpler framework of the BP classification and its conversion to 
an index by Alesina. I will then return to CF and the FJMRS index. 
Two Models of the Effects of CBI 
The BP model of CBI is simple but powerful. Central banks are classified, not measured. And 
the classification comes from the answers to three questions with two possible answers about 
features of the relationship between central bank and government that are a priori relevant: final 
policy authority, whether government on bank board, and whether government alone appoints 
the board. All other matters, such as the length of term of board membership, term of the 
governor, policy objective, are assumed to be either irrelevant or subsumed in the combination of 
features determined by the three relevant questions. 
BP then asks the question: Is the average inflation rate the same for all central bank types? 
This question can be answered in two equivalent ways. It can be answered directly by 
computing means and t-statistics or it can be answered by a regression of inflation on three 
dummy variables for types 2, 3, and 4. BP took the second approach, which is the equivalent of 
Cargill’s equation (1) above. 
                                                 
21 Cargill also uses the AS index in regressions for 1955 – 1988 and in pooled regressions for 1955 – 2000, but the years 1955 – 1971 were 
dominated by the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system so these results have no useful meaning. Bretton Woods trumps central bank laws in 
determining inflation and departures of national inflation rates from the world average rate are properly interpreted as changes in relative prices. 
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When AS translated BP’s classification into an index with cardinal properties, and when such 
an index is used in a regression like Cargill’s equation (2) above, the question changes. The 
coefficient β1 in equation (2) estimates the change in the inflation rate as we move from 1 to 2, 2 
to 3, and 3 to 4. So the question posed by this approach becomes: Are the differences in inflation 
across the central bank types constant as we move between adjacent types?  
Running a regression of inflation on a CBI estimates a coefficient that equals the least-squares 
estimator of the mean change in inflation as we move between adjacent types. This coefficient 
might be poorly determined and miss significant unequal differences across types. And it might 
be well-determined for either of two reasons: (1) the differences are constant and have small 
variance; or (2) at least one difference is significant and at least one other difference has large 
variance.  
Inspection of the BP data reveals that reason (2) is correct. The variance of inflation in type 2 
central banks is so large that it is not possible to say with any confidence what the change is from 
1 to 2 or from 2 to 3. The variance of inflation in types 3 and 4 is very small and type 4 has a 
smaller mean than type 3, so the least-squares estimate of the change in inflation is dominated by 
the two most independent banks. But degrees of freedom are scarce. Only two central banks are 
type 3 and two are type 4. It is these facts that are the source of the appearance that the change in 
inflation across types is constant. 
Inspection of the CF inflation data and FJMRS index reveals a similar pattern to that in the BP 
data. The variance of inflation at index values of 50 and 60 (about neutral independence) is large 
while the variance at 90 and 100 (most independent) is small and the inflation rate at 100 is 
smaller than at 90. But as in the BP data, only two central banks have in index of 100 and only 
one is at 90. So the appearance of significance is being driven by high variance and zero 
information at average and low values of the CBI index and low variance (and small sample) at 
high CBI index values. 
Although there are parallels in the source of misinformation in estimated inflation-CBI index 
equations using the BP classes and the FJMRS index, there are crucial differences between them. 
The contrast in the GMT and BP approaches highlights the key difference. 
Too Much Information to Classify: Construct an Index 
As noted above, GMT construct two CBI indexes by counting the number of ‘yes’ answers to 
16 questions. Four of those questions map to BP’s three questions.22 But that is the only 
similarity in the two approaches. Importantly, BP classify while GMT measure. And the measure 
                                                 
22 Question (6) ‘Is no government approval of monetary policy formulation required?’ and question (8) ‘Is there a legal provision that strengthens 
the central bank’s position in conflicts with the government?’ are similar to BP’s ‘final authority’ and questions (3) ‘Are some of the board not 
appointed by government?’ and (5) ‘Is there no mandatory participation of government representative in the board?’ are also BP questions. 
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has the property that one more ‘yes’ raises the index by one unit regardless of what the question 
is. GMT can only measure. If they classified, all their central bank types would be different.
23
 
Given the GMT indexes of CBI, what do we learn from an inflation regression that uses 
them? The answer noted earlier is that we learn that the variables ignored by BP in the GMT 
economic index seem to be important. But we don’t learn which variables are doing the work. It 
is tempting, but unconvincing, to say they all work equally well, though that is the implication of 
the way the index is constructed. A more thorough scrutiny of the correlations among the 
components of the index and some aggregation to generate a manageable set of types might be 
possible and a source of greater insight. 
The more detailed indexes of Cukierman and FJMRS have all the problems of the GMT index 
with the additional problem that the ‘yes’ answers are weighted so that arbitrary degrees of 
importance of various characteristics are imposed a priori. 
Is the arbitrariness of the CBI indexes a problem? While Cargill says it is, the Klomp-deHaan 
finding provides support for the indexes. Recall that they conclude that the particular CBI 
measure has little effect on its estimated effect on inflation. Further, the astonishing finding of 
CF about the apparent robustness of the relationship between two entirely different CBI indexes 
across two time periods (not included in Klomp-deHaan) seems to deny that the indexes are a 
problem. How are these findings to be interpreted? 
The meta-regression analysis merely reports that the significant negative relationship between 
CBI and inflation is robust across studies and is not influenced by the measure of CBI used. It 
doesn’t control for the amount of data mining undertaken. Nor does the conclusion sit well with 
the details of the 59 studies included in the analysis. In Table A1
24
 they summarize the 384 
regression included in the studies and the percentage that find a significant negative relationship. 
There are 202 with a significant negative relationship and 182 with either no relationship or, as 
noted above, significant but of wrong sign. 
The CF finding requires closer examination. 
Carlstrom-Fuerst Evaluated 
I have described Cargill’s probing of the robustness of the CF results and his alternative 
model. I now describe some further probing of my own. 
First, I replicated the CF result and checked that the relationship is robust with respect to time 
periods covered. Table 2 shows the estimated coefficient on CBI, its t-statistic, and R
2
 for a 
                                                 
23 With 16 variables each with two possible values, GMT have potentially 216 types. In the data, no two central banks share the same 
configuration of ‘yes’ answers although on economic independence, Portugal and Greece are the same and on political independence, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom are the same. 
24 Klomp and deHaan (1990, pp. 618 – 621) 
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regression like CF’s with just a constant and the FJMRS CBI index. Using the World Economic 
Outlook
25
 data base for October 2012, I was able to replicate the CF finding to a reasonable 
approximation for several sub-periods though for some, the CBI coefficient is not significant. 
Table 2 CF for Different Time Periods 
Period Data Coefficient t - statistic R
2
 
1988 - 2000 CF -6.61 -2.66 0.23 
1988 - 2000 WEO -5.81 -1.48 0.08 
1988 - 2011 WEO -5.44 -2.08 0.15 
2000 - 2011 WEO -4.83 -2.54 0.21 
2000 - 2001 WEO -3.87 -1.23 0.06 
Next, I explored the sub-indexes from which the FJMRS index is constructed and checked 
that the relationship between inflation and the sub-indexes is consistent with the relationship 
between inflation and the overall index. The FJMRS index is a weighted average of five sub-
indexes. Table 3 shows the coverage of these sub-indexes along with their weights. Given the 
construction of the CBI index, the regression of inflation on CBI can be regarded as a restricted 
version of a regression of inflation on PS, TI, II, FG, and TG. That is, in the more general 
regression, the coefficients on the sub-indexes should be their weights multiplied by the 
coefficient on CBI in the restricted regression. 
Table 3 FJMRS Independence Index Components 
Variable Abbreviation Weight
26
 
1. Statutory/legal objectives focus on price stability? PS 0.154 
2. Target independence TI 0.154 
3. Instrument independence II 0.308 
4. Central bank financing of government deficit FG 0.308 
5. Term of office of governor TG 0.077 
To check whether this implication of the model is true, I calculated the more general 
regression using the CF inflation data for 1988 – 2000, the period used by CF. Table 4 shows the 
result. The first column of estimates repeats the CF equation. The numbers in square brackets are 
t-statistics. The second column shows the coefficients in an unrestricted regression of inflation 
on the five sub-indexes. The final column shows what those coefficients would be if the CBI 
index were a true weighted aggregate of the sub-indexes. 
                                                 
25 The World Economic Outlook (WEO) data are slightly different from the data used by Carlstrom and Fuerst (CF) for a few countries. 
26 FJMRS express the weights as values that sum to 6.5. I have converted them to weights that sum to one. 
13 
 
Table 4 Inflation and the FJMRS Sub-Indexes 
 
Estimated Estimated Implied 
 
restricted unrestricted by weights 
Intercept 8.812 9.762 
 
 
[4.21] [3.09] 
 CBI -6.611 
  
 
[2.66] 
  PS 
 
0.174 -1.017 
  
[0.16] 
 TI 
 
-2.196 -1.017 
  
[2.39] 
 II 
 
-0.797 -2.034 
  
[0.58] 
 FG 
 
-3.653 -2.034 
  
[1.31] 
 TG 
 
-1.644 -0.509 
  
[1.44] 
 Sum of unrestricted coefficients 
 
-8.115 
 R
2
 0.227 0.384 
 
Note that all but one of the sub-indexes has the expected negative effect on the inflation rate. 
But also note that only one of the sub-indexes has a significant effect. That is target-
independence, TI. And the coefficient is a large – 2.196, which is more than twice the magnitude 
implied by its weight in CBI. Another large coefficient is that on financing government deficits, 
FG, but it is only weakly significant. 
The point estimates of all the negative coefficients are absolutely larger than implied by the 
weights in CBI and, despite the wrong sign on the price stability focus, PS, variable, the 
unrestricted coefficients sum to – 8.115, a stronger overall effect on inflation than estimated in 
the restricted regression. The positive effect of a focus on price stability is presumably to be 
interpreted as casting doubt on the index rather than as showing a real effect. 
An advocate of the CBI index approach might argue that looking only at CBI and its 
components is too narrow and that a wider set of variables must be used to control for the many 
legal and non-legal, and formal and informal arrangements. The FJMRS database provides an 
opportunity to test this view, though FJMRS clearly did not see this as its purpose. 
Again, using the CF inflation data and time period, I regressed the inflation rate on all the 
indexes constructed by FJMRS and Table 5 shows the result. Variable 5, Independence, is the 
CBI variable used by CF. It again has a significant negative effect on inflation and it is the only 
significant variable in the regression. Insignificant wrong signs are present on six of the variables 
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and almost significant wrong signs appear on accountability of central bank to government and 
the importance of analysis of the monetary and banking sector. 
Table 5 All FJMRS Indexes and their Effects on Inflation 
  Coefficients t-statistics 
Intercept 5.298 1.61 
1. Exchange rate focus 0.011 0.70 
2. Money focus 0.002 0.13 
3. Inflation focus -0.010 -0.58 
4. Discretion (high score implies more discretion) 0.001 0.11 
5. Independence (CBI) -0.067 -2.02 
6. Accountability of central bank to government 0.020 1.74 
7. Policy explanations 0.004 0.23 
8. Analysis of inflation expectations 0.007 0.46 
9. Analysis using models and forecasts 0.004 0.27 
10. Importance of analysis of money and banking sector 0.041 2.00 
11. Importance of financial stability issues in setting instruments -0.020 -0.80 
R
2
 0.531 
 
It might be expected that multicollinearity is the source of large standard errors and 
apparently insignificant effects. A check of the correlation matrix among the variables shows that 
the correlations are not large. 
Interestingly, though expected and a consequence of the index approach, the larger number of 
variables in the equation lowers the average value of the estimated effects of any one of the 
variables. With the original BP classification into four central bank types, shifting between types 
could, in principle, have a large effect. In the event, a large effect was found for only the most 
independent type. Moving from BP’s three variables to GMT’s sixteen decreases the average 
effect of any one of the GMT variables to 3/16ths the average of BP’s variables. And moving to 
the 54 variables of FJMRS decreases the average effect of each to almost zero. 
These mechanical changes in importance stem purely from the index number approach and 
shine a spotlight on its inappropriateness. The approach has been carried to the point that it 
obscures the issues and leaves us with little progress beyond what BP discovered more than 
thirty years ago. 
But we can do better. The events of the past thirty years have provided experiments from 
which we can learn. I now describe two of them. 
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III TWO NATURAL EXPERIMENTS 
The cross-country data are contaminated by social and political variables that might influence 
both the nation’s central bank law and its attitude toward inflation. For example, Germany’s 
strong social memory of hyperinflation might be the cause of the independence of its post-war 
central bank and its low inflation rate and that given Germany’s strong inflation aversion, even a 
government-dominated central bank might have delivered the same low inflation. 
Similarly, the equivalent memory in the psyche of the United Kingdom is the Great 
Depression. This event might be the cause of the U.K. government taking over and running the 
Bank of England and of the country’s pursuit of full employment at the cost of rising inflation 
and occasional devaluation. And given the British aversion to unemployment, it is possible that 
an independent Bank of England would have delivered the same inflation performance. 
To control for these possible effects and isolate the effects of central bank law, we need some 
natural experiments in which some central banking arrangements change and some do not 
change. When the central bank laws literature started, such experiments were unavailable. But 
we now have several examples of changes in central banking arrangements that make it possible 
to examine the relationship between the change in inflation and the change in central bank 
independence. The only existing attempt at this exercise is CF, but as explained earlier this 
attempt is not convincing. 
I am now going to describe two natural experiments that provide new insights into the effects 
of central bank legal arrangements on inflation and other macroeconomic outcomes. One 
experiment focusses on the effects of central bank independence and the other of the effects of 
formal and transparently implemented inflation targeting. 
Sample Selection, Treatment Groups, and Control Group 
I use annual data on CPI inflation and real GDP growth from 1980 through 2011 for 27 
advanced economies
27
. I started with the 35 economies that the IMF classifies as “Advanced” 
and eliminated six (Czech Republic, Estonia, Malta, San Marino, Slovakia, and Slovenia) 
because their data runs were seriously incomplete and two (Iceland and Israel) because their 
1980s inflation rates were well outside the range of all the others
28
 and I didn’t want these two 
economies to swamp the more normal variability present in the other the advanced economies. 
I then examined the amendments to central bank law in the remaining 27 economies and 
divided them into three groups: those that at some identifiable date became more independent 
(legally independent); those that adopted formal and transparently implemented inflation 
targeting; and those for which there was no apparent change in independence status and that did 
                                                 
27 The data source is the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012. 
28 Iceland’s inflation averaged 40 percent per year during the 1980s and Israel’s averaged 116 percent per year. 
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not adopt inflation targeting. There is overlap between the more independent and inflation 
targeting groups. 
Table 6 lists the twenty-seven economies and their assignment to the three groups. The table 
also shows the years in which a country’s central bank became more independent and/or adopted 
inflation targets. Of the twenty-seven listed, the central banks of fifteen became more 
independent during the past 30 years. 
Table 6 Treatment Groups and Control Group 
More Independent Inflation Targeter Control 
Belgium 1999 Australia 1993 Austria 
Cyprus 2008 Canada 1991 Denmark 
Finland 1999 New Zealand 1990 Germany 
France 1999 Sweden 1993 Hong Kong 
Greece 2001 UK 1992 Netherlands 
Ireland 1999 
  
Norway 
Italy 1999 
  
Singapore 
Japan 1997 
  
Switzerland 
Korea 1997 
  
Taiwan 
Luxembourg 1999 
  
United States 
New Zealand 1990 
   Portugal 1999 
   Spain 1999 
   Sweden 1999 
   United Kingdom 1999 
   
More Independent Central Banks 
New Zealand made the first move toward greater independence when it enacted a sweeping 
new central bank law in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989
29
. This Act created a truly 
independent but accountable central bank. It also declared a single-minded commitment to price 
stability. 
                                                 
29 Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1998) 
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Bank of Japan Act 1997
30
, the Bank of Korea Act 1997
31
, the Sveriges Riksbank Act 1998
32
, 
and the Bank of England Act 1998
33
 saw a similarly clear enunciation of a commitment to price 
stability by the policy decisions of an independent central bank. 
The ECB became fully operational on 1 January 1999. Before that date, Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain had 
their own central banks. After 1 January 1999, these country’s central banks ceded their 
monetary policy powers to the ECB. Other nations joined the eurozone and their central banks 
were replaced by the ECB in the years that followed (1 January 2001, Greece; 1 January 2007, 
Slovenia; 1 January 2008, Cyprus and Malta; 1 January 2009, Slovakia; and 1 January 2011, 
Estonia). 
The ECB was established as an independent central bank with a mandate to achieve an 
inflation target of between zero and 2 percent. Most of the national central banks replaced by the 
ECB were not independent, so for most of the Eurozone economies, the change was to a more 
independent central bank. But there was no such change for Germany. The independence of the 
ECB is similar to that of the Bundesbank so the independence of Germany’s central bank didn’t 
change. For this reason, Germany is placed in the control group. Two other Eurozone economies 
join Germany in the control group: Austria and the Netherlands. These two economies were 
effectively locked together with Germany through the 1980s and 1990s with a rigidly fixed 
exchange rate
34
. With a fixed exchange rate, a country adopts the policy outcome of the central 
bank law of the country against which it fixes. 
Transparent Inflation Targeters 
When FJMRS conducted their survey of central banks, fifteen were declared inflation 
targeters. The number is larger today. But the original inflation targeters that started this 
approach to monetary policy during the early 1990s are those listed in Table 6. All five central 
banks use a similar approach. A price index and a target range for its inflation rate is agreed with 
government; the bank aims to achieve the mid-point of the range but flexibly moves toward 
either extreme to moderate fluctuations in the real economy. A frequent report (variously titled 
“inflation report” or “monetary policy report” provides a detailed account of the bank’s forecasts 
and explanation for its policy decision. 
Does a move toward greater central bank independence lower the inflation rate? Does formal 
transparent inflation targeting deliver a lower inflation rate? And do greater independence and 
                                                 
30 Bank of Japan (1997) 
31 Cargill (2001) 
32 Sveriges Riksbank (1998) 
33 Bank of England (1998) 
34 The Austrian schilling was pegged at 7 D-marks and the Dutch guilder at 1.12 D-marks with almost no movement away from these values. 
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the pursuit of an inflation target bring greater real volatility? Or is there a free lunch with both 
inflation and real fluctuations subsiding? 
Looking for the Effects 
If central bank independence and inflation targeting influence monetary policy outcomes, 
these influences should be visible after countries modified the central bank laws and after 
countries adopted inflation targets. 
To reveal these influences, we must control for other factors that act on inflation and 
macroeconomic performance that were different during the 2000s from the 1980s and 1990s. 
Listing and measuring all these potential influences is neither feasible nor necessary. Instead, we 
can regard the countries with more independent central banks as one treatment group and the 
countries that adopted inflation targeting as a second treatment group. We can compare the 
macroeconomic performances of the countries in these groups with those of a control group of 
countries, a group of otherwise similar countries in otherwise similar times that did not change 
their central bank law or adopt an inflation target. The natural choice for the control group is the 
advanced economies listed in Table 6. 
Before and After 
For a “before” and an “after,” I calculated the mean inflation rates and the variability of 
inflation
35
 and real GDP growth for the 27 countries listed in Table 6. For the two treatment 
groups, the break year for “before” and “after” was 1 year after the policy change date shown in 
the table for real GDP growth and 2 years after for inflation. The rationale for these lags is that 
they reasonably represent the types of time lags found in time-series studies. For the control 
group, I calculated two versions: breaks in 1993 (real GDP) and 1994 (inflation) for the inflation 
targeting comparison and breaks in 2000 (real GDP) and 2001 (inflation) for the more 
independent comparison. 
What Do More Independence and Inflation Targeting Achieve? 
The first answer to these questions is obtained by inspecting scatter diagrams, which show the 
average inflation and variability of inflation (Figure 1) and the variability of inflation and real 
GDP growth (Figure 2) for the central banks that became more independent, and for the control 
group (Figures 3 and 4); and the same variables for the inflation targeters (Figures 5 and 6) and 
their controls (Figures 7 and 8). More independent central banks dramatically lower inflation 
and its variability but spread out to higher levels the variability of real GDP growth. Inflation 
                                                 
35 Variability is measured by the standard deviations of the inflation rate and the real GDP growth rate. 
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targeters deliver a similar outcome for inflation but slightly lower the variability of real GDP 
growth. 
Table 7 shows summary statistics for the data plotted in the scatter diagrams. 
Table 7 Summary Statistics for Two Natural Experiments 
 
Before After 
1980 - 2011 Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation 
 
Inflation Inflation 
Real GDP 
growth Inflation Inflation 
Real GDP 
growth 
More independent 6.42 4.71 2.25 2.24 1.07 2.75 
Control MI 3.79 2.85 2.23 1.18 1.24 2.60 
       Inflation targeters 7.43 3.95 2.28 2.07 1.03 1.92 
Control IT 4.55 2.90 2.30 1.81 1.30 2.46 
Table 8 Before and After Changes  
 
Mean Standard deviation 
 
Inflation Inflation Real GDP growth 
More independent before 6.42 4.71 2.25 
More independent after 2.24 1.07 2.75 
Change for more independent –4.18 –3.65 0.51 
Standard error 0.87 0.49 0.30 
t-statistic 4.82 7.38 1.66 
    Inflation targeters before 7.43 3.95 2.28 
Inflation targeters after 2.07 1.03 1.92 
Change for inflation targeters –5.36 –2.91 –0.36 
Standard error of change 0.87 0.38 0.30 
t-statistic 6.19 7.74 1.21 
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Absolute changes 
The countries in which the central bank became more independent lowered their inflation 
rates, lowered the variability of inflation, but increased the variability of real GDP growth. The 
standard errors of the changes are small for inflation and its variability and these changes are 
strongly significant. Only the change in real GDP growth variability is insignificant. Table 8 
shows the changes and the significance tests. 
The numbers for inflation targeters tell a similar story to those for more independent banks 
with one exception. These countries lowered their inflation rates, lowered the variability of 
inflation, and they lowered the variability of real GDP growth. Again, the standard errors of the 
changes are small for inflation and its variability and these changes are strongly significant. And 
again, the change in real GDP growth variability is insignificant. 
Inflation in Controls Lower than in Treatments 
Notice that the mean inflation rates in Table 8 show that the control groups have lower 
inflation rates than the two treatment groups. Recall, however, that the controls are not all 
government dependent central banks. They are countries in which the central bank law didn’t 
change, not those that have government dependent central banks. Indeed, the group includes 
three Eurozone economies and Switzerland, all of which have independent central banks. The 
group also includes the United States, Hong Kong, and Singapore, economies not noted for a 
lack of monetary discipline. 
Changes Compared to Control? 
The absolute changes in monetary policy outcomes don’t tell us the effects of the policy 
change. To see that change, we need to ask how the two treatment groups compare with the 
controls. 
Table 9 provides the relevant data. It shows only two significant effects: The more 
independent central banks lowered the variability of inflation significantly more than did the 
control group. And the inflation targeters lowered the mean inflation rate significantly more than 
its decrease in the control group. The means of all the other effects are in the expected direction 
but the confidence in these changes is not a strong as it is for the two significant effects. 
The conclusions that emerge from the experiment of more independence do not contradict 
earlier findings on the effects of CBI. Lower inflation variability, higher output variability, and 
maybe lower inflation are basically what earlier cross-country studies have shown. But the 
conclusions from the inflation targeting experiment cast doubt on the necessity of central bank 
independence. An inflation control contract with government transparently pursued can 
apparently do a very good job. 
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Table 9 Changes Relative to Controls 
 
Mean Standard deviation 
 
Inflation Inflation Real GDP growth 
    Change for more independent –4.18 –3.65 0.51 
Change for control MI –2.61 –1.61 0.37 
Difference –1.57 –2.04 0.14 
Standard error 1.03 0.63 0.29 
t-statistic 1.52 3.24 0.47 
    Change for inflation targeters –5.36 –2.91 –0.36 
Change for control IT –2.74 –1.60 0.16 
Difference –2.62 –1.31 –0.53 
Standard error 1.01 1.00 0.38 
t-statistic 2.61 1.31 1.37 
IV CHANGING CONSTRAINTS ON CENTRAL BANKS 
I conclude by speculating about changing constraints on central banks that might challenge 
their independence and influence. Four changes strike me as being important: (1) ideas, (2) 
deficits, (3) global integration, and (4) private, gold-like e-money. I reflect briefly on each. 
Ideas 
Ideas, as Keynes famously said, are dangerous for good or evil. Over the past thirty years, 
ideas about macroeconomics and money have played their role at both ends of the good-evil 
spectrum. The wide acceptance of the natural rate hypothesis and associated demise of the 
Phillips curve, the insight that a rule beats discretion, the emergence of the Taylor curve and rule, 
the move toward greater independence of central banks, and the adoption of transparent inflation 
targeting are all ideas that have contributed to improved monetary policy and the universal lower 
inflation rates so vividly seen in the scatter diagrams in this paper. 
But we now have a good-ideas vacuum and a glut of bad ideas. Recession and slow recovery 
are tempting many influential people to advocate using monetary policy to pursue real goals that 
it is incapable of achieving. Targeting nominal GDP and setting an unemployment target are 
examples. Other troublesome ideas include expanding the central bank’s mandate to include 
financial stability—financial regulation and identifying and pricking speculative bubbles. 
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Pursued vigorously enough, these ideas have the power to undo the good work of the past two 
decades in reigning in inflation. 
Deficits 
With an aging population and an increase in years of schooling, and a large part of the cost of 
health care and education funded by governments, it is difficult to see how government deficits 
can be avoided. The United States might introduce a European style value-added tax and get 
some relief from deficits for a few years. But even with its high taxes, France and some other 
European governments are unable to avoid ongoing and large deficits. No matter how 
independent they are, it is likely that central banks will be challenged by ballooning government 
debt. 
Global Integration 
We live in a world of multiple fiat monies. One country’s monetary policy actions influence 
the monetary policies of other countries. Inflation targeters cannot focus only on inflation and 
must pay attention to the effects of their interest rate decisions on interest rate differentials and 
exchange rate movements. Independent central banks have limited independence from each other 
and interdependence is likely to increase as electronic currency trading spreads and becomes 
available in retail currency markets. 
Private Gold-Like e-Money 
A small revolution in private gold-like e-money has already started. Its name is Bitcoin. The 
quantity of Bitcoin grows as people ‘mine’ it, and like a real commodity, the cost of mining rises 
as the un-mined stock depletes, so the mined stock grows at a decreasing rate until it eventually 
stops growing. The price of a unit of Bitcoin is determined by market demand and supply. 
Bitcoin has PSP (payment services provider) status in Europe and the ECB has seen it necessary 
to write about it.
36
 Bitcoin is actively traded against government monies and is increasingly 
widely accepted as a means of payment. If this private e-money and perhaps other competing 
private e-monies become more universal, central bank liabilities will lose what remnants of 
monopoly status they currently enjoy. And regardless of their independence from governments, 
central banks will be constrained by a potentially falling demand for their liabilities. 
Research on central bank independence during the next three decades will be dominated by 
these changing constraints and be even more challenging than the past three decades have been. 
                                                 
36 European Central Bank (2012) 
23 
 
  
24 
 
  
25 
 
REFERENCES 
Alesina, A. (1988) “Macroeconomics and Politics.” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual, edited by 
Stanley Fischer, 17-52. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Alesina, A., and L. H. Summers. “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: 
Some Comparative Evidence.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25, 1993, 151–62. 
Arnone, M., Laurens, B.J. and Segalotto, J.-F. (2006) The measurement of central bank 
autonomy: survey of models, indicators, and empirical evidence. IMF Working Paper No. 
06/227. 
Backus, D., and J. Driffill (1985) “Inflation and Reputation,” American Economic Review, 15, 
530- 538. 
Bade, R. and M. Parkin (1978) “Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policies: A Preliminary 
Investigation,” in M. Porter (ed.), The Australian Monetary System in the 1970s, Monash 
University. 
Bade, R., and M. Parkin. “Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy.” Unpublished Manuscript, 
University of Western Ontario, 1982. 
Bade, R., and M. Parkin. “Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy.” Unpublished Manuscript, 
University of Western Ontario, 1988. Accessed November 19, 2012. 
http://economics.uwo.ca/faculty/parkin/CentralBankLaws.pdf 
Bank of England (1998) Bank of England Act 1998 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/legislation/1998act.pdf 
Bank of Japan Act 1997, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/boja.pdf 
Barro, R. J. (1983) “Inflationary Finance Under Discretion and Rules,” The Canadian Journal of 
Economics 16 (1), February, 1-16. 
Barro, R. J. and David B. Gordon (1983a) “Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model 
of Monetary Policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics 12(1), 101-122. 
 and (1983b) “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model,”  
Journal of Political Economy 91 (4), 589-610. 
Cargill, T. F. (2013) “A Critical Assessment of Measures of Central Bank Independence” 
Economic Inquiry, Vol 51, Issue 1, January, 260 – 272; first published online 16 January 2012. 
Cargill, T. F. “Central Bank Independence in Korea.” Journal of the Korean Economy, 2, 2001, 
1–33. 
Carlstrom, C. T., and T. S. Fuerst (2009) “Central Bank Independence and Inflation: A Note.” 
Economic Inquiry, 47, 182–86. 
Cukierman, A. S. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992. 
European Central Bank (2012) “Virtual Currency Schemes” October. 
Fry, M., D. Julius, L. Mahadeva, S. Roger, and G. Sterne. (2000) “Key Issues in the Choice of 
Monetary Policy Framework,” in Monetary Policy Frameworks in a Global Context, edited by L. 
26 
 
Mahadeva and G. Sterne. London: Routledge, and available with Excel spread sheet at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/ccbs/publications/mpfagc.aspx. 
Gordon, R. J. (1975) “The Demand for and Supply of Inflation,” Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. xviii, December, 807-836. 
Grilli, V., D. Masciandaro, and G. Tabellini. (1991) “Political and Monetary Institutions and 
Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries.” Economic Policy, 13, 341–92. 
Klomp, J. G., and J. de Haan. (2010) “Inflation and Central Bank Independence: A Meta 
Regression Analysis.” Journal of Economic Surveys, 24, 593–621. 
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott (1977) “Rules Rather than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of  Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy 85 (3), 473-91. 
Meltzer, Allan H., and Alex Cukierman (1986) “A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and 
Inflation Under  Discussion and Asymmetric Information,” Econometrica 54, September, 
p p . 1099-1128. 
Parkin, M. (1987) “Domestic Monetary Institutions and Deficits” in Buchanan J, C Rowley, and 
R. Tollison, (eds.), Deficits, Basil Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 310-337 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, (1998) The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989: Our 
Accountability to New Zealanders, March, http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/about/acct.pdf 
Sveriges Riksbank (2012) The Sveriges Riksbank Act, http://www.riksbank.se/en/The-
Riksbank/Legislation/The-Sveriges-Riksbank-Act/ 
Taylor, John B, (1979) “Estimation and Control of a Macroeconomic Model with Rational 
Expectations,” Econometrica, 47 (5), September, 1267-1286 
